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Plato, as is well known, presents the Sophist 
as a literary companion to the Theaetetus. Most 
conspicuously, the Sophist’s first line—Theo-
dorus: ‘We’ve come at the proper time by yes-
terday’s agreement, Socrates’ (216a1)—directly 
answers the last lines of the Theaetetus—So-
crates: ‘let us meet here again in the morning, 
Theodorus’ (210d3-4).1 In this way and others, 
Plato rhetorically f lags the Sophist as a conti-
nuation of the recorded conversation begun at 
Theaetetus 143d1. 
The Sophist does not merely pick up where 
the Theaetetus leaves off, however. The two dia-
logues are more intimately connected. In what 
is perhaps the most famous example, the So-
phist fills out the Theaetetus’ discussion of false 
judgment. Rather than simply branching out in 
new directions, the Sophist, at least on occasion, 
is informed by, returns to, and supplements 
substantive discussions in the Theaetetus.
In what follows, I aim to highlight another 
such point of contact between the two dialo-
gues. Specifically, I will present three com-
prehensively developed parallels between, on 
the one hand, the Theaetetus’ discussion of the 
f lux theorists and their ‘secret doctrine’ and, 
on the other hand, the Sophist’s discussion of 
the giants in their fight against the ‘friends 
of forms.’ I will show that [1] both passages 
exhibit the same basic structure, in which two 
substantive positions are presented on behalf of 
two separate parties, related to one another by 
their comparative sophistication or refinement, 
and that [2] those parties and [3] their respec-
tive positions are characterized in remarkably 









The Theaetetus’ ‘secret doctrine’ and the 
Sophist’s ‘battle between gods and giants’ have 
long fascinated Plato scholars. I show that the 
passages systematically parallel one another. 
Each presents two substantive positions that 
are advanced on behalf of two separate parties, 
related to one another by their comparative so-
phistication or refinement. Further, those parties 
and their respective positions are characterized 
in substantially similar terms. On the basis of 
these sustained parallels, I argue that the two 
passages should be read together, with each 
informing and constraining an interpretation of 
the other.
Keywords: Plato; Theaetetus; Sophist; secret 
doctrine; battle of gods and giants; dunamis; 
kinêsis
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Figure	1:	sustained	parallels	in	the	Theaetetus-Sophist
Elements of these parallels have been ob-
served previously, but they are almost always 
mentioned only in passing, typically consigned 
to footnotes.2 By focusing on them directly and 
considering them as a group, I aim to support 
a pair of related methodological theses. In par-
ticular, I submit, Plato’s efforts to wed these 
sections of the Theaetetus and Sophist suggest 
that an interpretation of the relevant part of 
either dialogue both can inform and should 
complement an interpretation of the other. If 
correct, we will have a trove of fresh resour-
ces, from Plato himself no less, to guide our 
interpretations of two of the most notoriously 
challenging passages in the corpus. 
Let me begin with the relevant section of 
the Sophist (246a-249d). The Eleatic Visitor the-
re presents ‘something like a battle between 
gods and giants […] over being’ (246a4-5).3 The 
battleground is ontology. Each party aims to 
advance a ‘detailed account […] of that which 
is’ (245e6). 
From this introduction, one might expect 
those on either side of the field to uniformly 
hold a single view. But this is not the case. At 
any rate, the giants, on whom I will focus,4 
are hardly a monolithic group. They split into 
two factions. At the outset of the battle, we 
meet the first—the ‘crude giants,’ as I will call 
them. They ‘insist that only what offers tan-
gible contact is, since they define being as the 
same as body’ (246a10-b1). Their initial foray, 
then, consists in offering a view about both the 
intension and the extension of being. What it 
is to be, on the crude giants’ account, is to be a 
body. Accordingly, all and only bodies—those 
things affording tangible contact—are.5
That identification of being and body lea-
ves the crude giants immediately vulnerable 
to attack and prefigures the introduction of a 
second faction to take up their standard. The 
trouble for the crude giants begins with the 
extensional component of their thesis. Some of 
the things that respectable Greeks would count 
among beings do not seem to be bodies.6 Of 
special note are souls and the virtues. 
Since the crude giants are said to be diffi-
cult—’perhaps just about impossible’ (246d1)—
to talk to, we cannot be certain whether they 
would [i] admit souls and virtues as genuine 
exceptions and so challenges to their thesis, [ii] 
bite the bullet and preclude them from their 
ontology, or like the Stoics after them,7 [iii] 
take both souls and virtues to be bodies and 
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so unproblematic. The Visitor suggests that the 
crude giants, hardened in their ways, would 
def lect the question, stubbornly reasserting 
their thesis and failing to engage (247c4-5). 
When challenged, they just ‘won’t listen […] 
any more’ (246b3). 
In the crude giants’ stead, the Visitor thus 
questions some imagined ‘better people’ (246d7 
and e2), whom I will call ‘refined giants.’ The 
refined giants are partial to the view of their 
crude compatriots but ultimately concede de-
feat on that front. ‘The soul seems to them to 
have a kind of body,’ making it, if not a body, at 
least bodily and so providing a small measure 
of solace; ‘but as far as [the virtues] are con-
cerned, they’re ashamed and don’t dare either 
to agree that they are not beings or to insist 
that they are all bodies’ (247b8-c2). Since the 
refined giants will neither dismiss souls and 
the virtues as nonbeings nor accept them as 
bodies, options [ii] and [iii] are off the table. 
This leaves only option [i] remaining. With the 
soul and the virtues in mind, the refined giants 
retreat from the crude position that everything 
is a body and, with it, from the position that 
being and body are the same.
To retrench, the Visitor claims, they have 
to reflect upon the various kinds of beings that 
they recognize—namely, bodies and now souls 
and the virtues as well—and determine what 
is common among them that might qualify 
them all as beings (247d2-4).8 Since the refined 
giants are not present to speak for themselves, 
Theaetetus and the Visitor suggest a new, more 
fortified position on their behalf. The refined 
giants are thus agreed to advance the view that 
‘a thing really is if it has any capacity at all, 
either by nature to do something to something 
else or to have even the smallest thing done to 
it by even the most trivial thing;’ they ‘take it 
as a definition9 that those which are amount 
to nothing other than capacity’ (247d8-e4; cf. 
248c4-5).
This new position, as one commentator puts 
it, ‘is not a complete abandonment’ of the crude 
giants but rather ‘an attempt to articulate the 
spirit of their original position, in a way that ac-
commodates the Visitor’s counterargument.’10 
Its emphasis on capacity (dunamis) is distilled 
from the introduction of bodies as whatever 
is causally salient. For the crude giants, the 
noteworthy mark of a body was that it affor-
ded tangible contact (246a10).11 Bodies, that 
is, were first presented as having a particular 
kind of capacity for action or passion. The re-
fined giants thus home in on the only feature 
of bodies that the crude giants had singled out 
for attention and present it in its pure, unadul-
terated form. That is, the refined giants are not 
merely possessed of a better, or more refined, 
character than their crude compatriots; their 
position refines that of their crude compatriots 
as well. And that latter refinement is of no small 
significance. It allows the refined giants to treat 
souls and the virtues alongside bodies,12 thus 
disarming the Visitor’s challenge.
With that survey of the giants’ tours of duty 
complete, I turn now to the Theaetetus’ f luxists 
and begin to draw parallels between the two. 
The fluxists make their entrance in connection 
with Theaetetus’ proposal that ‘knowledge is 
simply perception’ (151e2-3). Socrates will di-
sabuse him of that view, but the path forward 
is long and largely indirect. For the most part, 
Socrates’ objections are leveled at one of two 
theses that Theaetetus’ proposed definition of 
knowledge is purported to imply:13 the familiar, 
Protagorean dictum that ‘man is the measure of 
all things’ (152a2-3) and a much less familiar, 
‘secret doctrine’ (152c10) held by some ‘f luent 
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fellows’ (181a4), who are commonly referred to 
in the secondary literature as ‘f lux theorists,’ 
or ‘f luxists.’14
Initially, it seems as if the f luxists are most 
concerned to advance a theory of perception 
and some related theses in the philosophy of 
language. But as it turns out, these are deriva-
tive parts of their doctrine. At its core, Socrates 
claims, the secret doctrine presents an onto-
logy. As he puts it, their various claims about 
perception and language ‘begin from the prin-
ciple [archê] that everything is really motion 
and there is nothing besides motion’ (156a3-5).
I discuss that principle below. What is im-
portant to observe at the outset is that just as 
the Sophist presented two factions of giants, 
so, too, the Theaetetus presents two factions 
of f luxists. Before introducing the heart of the 
secret doctrine, Socrates issues a warning. We 
must take care, he says, that ‘none of the uni-
nitiated are listening’ (155e3). What can one 
say about this latter group? To begin, they are 
obviously not party to the content of the se-
cret doctrine, for otherwise there would be no 
reason to avoid expressing it in their presence. 
Nonetheless, they cannot simply be identified 
with those who have not yet come to know the 
secret doctrine, for otherwise Theaetetus would 
count among their ranks, and Socrates would 
not go on to present it to him.15 Instead, they are 
broadly in league with those already initiated, 
but they stand, as of yet, separated off; much 
like fraternity pledges, they are candidates for 
being brought into the fold.
Further, the uninitiated are distinguished 
from their initiated compatriots by their com-
parative lack of refinement. They are said to be 
‘very crude people [amousoi]’ (Theait. 156a2) 
relative to the ‘much more refined [polu komp-
soteroi]’ initiates (156a2).16 That is, the unini-
tiated are the crude counterparts to a faction 
of more refined f luxists, standing to them just 
as the crude giants stood in relation to their 
more civilized and sophisticated compatriots 
(Soph. 246c9, d7, and e2).17
The crude giants are further characterized 
in two ways that even more powerfully liken 
them to the Sophist’s crude giants. First, Plato 
describes them in corporeal terms, associating 
them with the earth especially. They are ‘hard 
to the touch [sklêros]’ and ‘resistant [antitu-
pous]’ (Theait. 155e7-156a1),18 making them 
firm examples of bodies, as the crude giants 
describe them, which ‘offer tangible contact’ 
(Soph. 246a10).19 The nature of their develop-
ment is even more telling. We learn that ‘There 
are no pupils and teachers among these people. 
They just spring up on their own [automatoi 
anaphusontai]’ (Theait. 180b9-c1). That final 
expression models their genesis on that of plan-
ts, growing of themselves from the earth. This 
finds an analogue in the Visitor’s description 
of the crude giants as ‘earth people [gêgeneis]’ 
(Soph. 248c1), ‘grown from seed [spartoi]’ and 
‘sprung from the land itself [autochthones]’ 
(247c5).20
And second, much as the crude giants are 
‘just about impossible’ to converse with (Soph. 
246d1), one cannot have a philosophical dis-
cussion with a crude f luxist ‘any more than 
[one] could with a maniac’ (Theait. 179e5-6). 
The trouble, as in the case of the crude giants, 
who could not be compelled to ‘answer less 
wildly’ (Soph. 246d6), is that the crude f luxists 
are restless. As Theodorus’ puts it: ‘As for abi-
ding by what is said, or sticking to a question, 
or quietly answering and asking questions in 
turn, there is less than nothing21 of that in their 
capacity’ (Theait. 179e7-180a2).22
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The crude fluxists resemble the crude giants 
not only in description but also in doctrine. Their 
insistence that ‘nothing exists but what they 
can grasp with both hands’ (Theait. 155e4-5) 
very nicely tracks the crude giants’ insistence 
‘that only what offers tangible contact is’ (Soph. 
246a10-b1).23 Indeed, their view is even more 
forcefully recalled by a later summation of the 
crude giants’ position: namely, that ‘anything 
they can’t squeeze in their hands is absolutely 
nothing’ (Soph. 247c5-7).24 These giants thus 
approach the battlefield ‘clutching rocks and 
trees with their hands’ (246a8-9)—that is, clin-
ging to the tangible bodies on the ground, in 
contrast to the invisible beings that the friends 
of forms, their foes, champion from more ethe-
real climes.
These parallels cannot but be deliberate on 
Plato’s part. The crude f luxists and the crude 
giants are presented as being one and the same, 
as are their positions. Since we have seen that 
each of these crude factions is compared to 
a more refined one, we should expect to find 
further parallels in Plato’s presentations of 
their more refined compatriots and their more 
refined positions. The texts push, albeit less 
forcefully, precisely in that direction.
Apart from their relative refinement, which 
should be regarded as an initial parallel, neither 
the nobler f luxists nor giants are particularly 
well described. There is accordingly little to 
compare across Plato’s characterizations of 
each. That absence of characterization, howe-
ver, should itself be regarded as a further pa-
rallel in Plato’s presentation, for its explanation 
is in each case the same: namely, both camps 
are ultimately presented as being fictional.25 
Because the Theaetetus’ crude f luxists are not 
capable of conversation, Socrates, Theaetetus, 
and Theodorus agree to ‘come to the rescue’ 
(164e6) and ‘take their doctrine out of their 
hands and consider it for ourselves’ (180c5-6). 
Whether someone actually holds the doctrine 
in question is incidental to the discussion. As 
a result, the refined f luxists are not so much 
advocates of a position as they are placeholders 
for anyone who might (be tempted to) advance 
it.26 Similarly, in the Sophist, Theaetetus and 
the Visitor agree to deal with the crude giants’ 
intransigency ‘by making them actually better 
than they are […] in words’ (246d4-5). As a 
consequence, the focus must again be more 
on the position than on those who hold it. As 
the Visitor says, ‘we’re not concerned with the 
people; we’re looking for what’s true’ (246d8-9).
What, then, can we say about the ways in 
which their respective doctrines are presented? 
At first glance, frankly, they would appear to 
be at odds. That of the refined giants is framed 
in terms of capacity (dunamis). Their central 
tenet, to recall, is that ‘those which are amount 
to nothing other than capacity’ (Soph. 247e3-
4). That of the refined f luxists, by contrast, 
is framed in terms of motion (kinêsis). Their 
central tenet is that ‘everything is really motion 
and there is nothing besides motion’ (Theait. 
156a3-5). 
There are, nevertheless, two principle clas-
ses of parallels that serve to largely bridge that 
difference in framing and more broadly align 
the two doctrines.27 The first class bears di-
rectly on their central claims. To begin, we 
may note, both are ontological. Both, fur-
ther, appeal to a single criterion (capacity; 
motion).28 And in each case, that criterion is 
similarly dichotomous. For the refined giants, 
there are two basic kinds of capacities, those 
for action and those for passion (Soph. 247e1, 
248c5 and 7). Likewise, for the refined f luxis-
ts, ‘there are two kinds of motion, […] the one 
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having the capacity to act and the other the 
capacity to be acted upon’ (Theait. 156a5-7, 
trans. after McDowell). 
Their central claims are thus related not 
only in structure but also in content, as both 
use capacities for action and passion to grou-
nd their respective doctrines.29 This parallel 
is strengthened by a common conception of 
actions and passions and, thus, of the capaci-
ties for them. First, both assume that actions 
and passions just are motions. In light of their 
treatment of the two kinds of motion, I take it 
that this is obvious for the refined f luxists.30 
But one also finds the assumption operative 
in the Sophist, where those in the grips of the 
refined giants’ doctrine find it inevitable that, 
for example, if being known is a passion, ‘then 
insofar as [a thing] is known, it’s moved [ki-
neisthai]’ (248e3-4).31 Accordingly, both parties 
assume that capacities, generally, are capacities 
for motion.32 Second, both assume that actions 
and passions are systematically interrelated. 
In particular, for every action there is a dis-
tinct, complementary and reciprocal passion, 
and vice versa. The refined f luxists thus speak 
of their ‘twin births’ (Theait. 156b1), and the 
refined giants assume, for example, that ‘if 
knowing is doing something, then necessarily 
[anagkaion] what is known has something done 
to it’ (Soph. 248d10-e1). Accordingly, both as-
sume that the capacities for those actions and 
passions are analogously paired.33
A second, indirect class of parallels obtains 
between the corollaries drawn, in each dialogue, 
from those central ontological claims. Before 
addressing them, however, a preliminary point 
is in order. In the Sophist, those corollaries are 
revealed in the Visitor’s treatment of the giants’ 
opponents, the friends of forms, who initially 
accept a qualified version of the refined giants’ 
capacity doctrine. At this point in the exchange, 
the friends of forms alter the capacity doctrine 
only by qualifying its scope. The doctrine applies 
in full, they allege, to everything that the refined 
giants recognize in the ontology (that is, as the 
friends of forms would put it, to the entire do-
main of coming-to-be); yet there is also, on their 
view, a more exalted domain of imperceptible, 
non-bodily forms to which the capacity doctrine 
does not apply (248c1-9). The friends of forms 
are thus a valuable source for the refined giants’ 
capacity doctrine. 
Two points in that discussion are especially 
striking. First, insofar as they hold the capacity 
doctrine, the friends of forms are said to ‘break 
[bodies] up into little bits and call each a pro-
cess of coming-to-be instead of being’ (Soph. 
246b9-c2). This cannot but recall the refined 
f luxists’ claim that each body is an ‘aggregate 
[hathroismati]’ of ‘becomings’ that resist des-
cription in terms of ‘the verb “to be”’ (Theait. 
157b1-c3; cf. 152d7-e1). Second, and even more 
notably, the friends of forms take perception to 
be the analogue of knowledge in the domain of 
coming-to-be (Soph. 248a10-11). Since, again, 
this is only domain that the refined giants ad-
mit, the implication is that knowledge is no 
mere analogue of perception for the refined 
giants; it just is perception. That is to say, the 
refined giants are presented as being commi-
tted to the single most dialectically significant 
corollary of the refined f luxists’ position—na-
mely, the claim that ‘knowledge is simply per-
ception’ (Theait. 151e2-3).34 All told, I submit, 
we thus have considerable evidence for strongly 
associating the refined f luxists with the refi-
ned giants and for strongly associating their 
respective positions.
If, as these parallels suggest, the Theaetetus’ 
f luxists and the Sophist’s giants are, at the very 
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least, philosophical kin, then our interpretative 
approach to these dialogues should be dramati-
cally altered. On the one hand, we are licensed 
to draw upon, and would do well consult, the 
relevant section of one dialogue to inform and 
advance an interpretation of that of the other. 
On the other hand, we are at the same time 
constrained, in that an interpretation of the 
one should not, on the whole, fail to broadly 
compliment an interpretation of the other. In 
each respect, standard interpretations of the 
Theaetetus-Sophist will require revision and 
supplementation. My hope is that we are now 
better poised to determine the form that those 
emendations should take.35
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Barnes 2001: M. Barnes, The Power of God: Δύναμιϛ in 
Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian Theology, Cath-
olic University of America Press, Washington, 
DC 2001.
Beere 2009: J. Beere, Doing and Being: An Interpre-
tation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Theta, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford-New York 2009.
Benardete 1984: S. Benardete, The Being of the Beauti-
ful: Plato’s Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1984.
Bluck 1975: R. S. Bluck, Plato’s Sophist: A Commentary, 
Manchester University Press, Manchester 1975.
Bostock 1988: D. Bostock, Plato’s Theaetetus, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford-New York 1988. 
Brancacci 2011: A. Brancacci, La dottrina riservata di 
Protagora (Plat. Theaet. 152c7-e1), «Méthexis» 
24 (2011), 87–108. 
Brown 1998: L. Brown, ‘Innovation and Continuity: 
The Battle of Gods and Giants, Sophist 245-249’, 
in Jyl Gentzler (ed.), Method in Ancient Philoso-
phy, Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York 
1998, 181–207. 
Brunschwig 1994: J. Brunschwig, ‘The Stoic Theory of 
the Supreme Genus and Platonic Ontology’, in 
J. Brunschwig (ed.), Papers in Hellenistic Philos-
ophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
1994, 92–157. 
Burnyeat 1982: M. Burnyeat, ‘Idealism and Greek 
Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berke-
ley Missed’, «The Philosophical Review» 91:1 
(1982), 3–40. 
Burnyeat 1990: M. Burnyeat, The Theaetetus of Plato, 
Hackett Pub., Indianapolis 1990. 
Campbell 1867: L. Campbell, The Sophistes and Polit-
icus of Plato, 1973 reprint edition, Arno Press, 
New York 1867.
Campbell 1861: L. Campbell, The Theaetetus of Plato, 
1973 reprint edition, Arno Press, New York 1861.
Centrone 2008: B. Centrone, Platone: Sofista, Einaudi, 
Torino 2008.
Chappell 2011: T. Chappell, ‘Making Sense of the 
Sophist: Ten Answers to Ten Questions’, in 
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NOTES
1  Unless otherwise noted, translations of Plato’s 
works follow those in Cooper 1997.
2  Sedley 2004, 46 n. 9 notes parallel [1].  
McDowell 1973, 137 hints at something along the lines 
of [2] or [3], components of which are registered more 
explicitly if briefly by Benardete 1984, I.108 n. 10; II.41  
n. 65 and 130 n. 73, Centrone 2008, n. 106 and 107,  
Cornford 1935, 48 n. 2, Karfík 2011, 124 and 131, Klein 
1977, 89, Notomi 1999, 217 n. 21, Polansky 1992, 96, 
Ross 1953, 102–103, Sedley 2004, 46 n. 9, Seeck 2011, 74 
n. 62, Špinka 2011, 232, Teisserenc 2012, 74, 76, and 78, 
Waterfield 1987, 38 n. 2, and Wiehl 1967, n. 74 and n. 
78. Many prominent commentaries—e.g., Bluck 1975, 
Bostock 1988, Burnyeat 1990, Chappell 2005, Cooper 
1990, Duerlinger 2005, Heidegger 1997, Migliori 2007, 
Rosen 1983, Rijk 1986, and Seligman 1974—neglect to in 
any way address these parallels. Campbell 1861 and 1867 
and Gonzalez 2011 are exceptions to prove the rule both 
in consistently comparing the two passages and in doing 
so more than merely in passing.
3  Combat metaphors run throughout and 
frame this section of the Sophist. Notomi 1999, 217 n. 22 
presents an extensive catalogue. 
 The Theaetetus’ fluxists are similarly engaged 
in battle: ‘There is no small fight going on about [their 
conception of being], anyway—and no shortage of 
fighting men’ (179d4-5). Indeed, as a group, they form ‘an 
army led by Homer’ (153a1-2) and wage a ‘most vigorous 
campaign’ to advance their theory (179d8). For extended 
discussion, see Nercam 2013.
4  The giants’ side of the fight grounds most of 
the parallels that I will draw, below, to the Theaetetus
5  On the connection between body and tangible 
contact, see note 11 below.
6  Note, for example, Theaetetus’ emphatic 
responses at Soph. 246e6-247a4.
7  On the Stoics’ engagement with this passage 
in the Sophist, see the excellent study by Brunschwig 
1994. Sellars 2010, for a different assessment, is suspicious 
of a connection. 
8  The assumption that all beings will have some 
one thing in common in virtue of which they are beings 
is accepted by all parties. It is hardly innocent, however. 
Aristotle’s focal analysis of being is a clear, ancient alter-
native. Wittgensteinean family resemblance is a modern 
one.
9  There is a large body of literature on whether 
‘horos’ should be translated as ‘definition’ or, less 
strongly, ‘mark.’ For a recent overview of and engaging 
contribution to the debate, see Leigh 2010. While I am 
inclined to think ‘definition’ the better option, nothing 
below will depend on how one decides the question. Since 
I am arguing for a pair of methodological claims about 
how one should approach interpreting the Theaetetus and 
the Sophist, I aim to keep substantive interpretive claims 
to a minimum. 
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10  Beere 2009, 7. His development of the point 
comes in three stages. Mine, in the remainder of the 
paragraph, overlaps with the first of them.
11  The refined giants will later associate body 
with visibility as well (247b3-5). Body is similarly marked 
by tangibility and visibility in the Timaeus (31b4 espe-
cially). Contrast both Platonic passages with Aristotle’s 
view, on which the primary mark of a body is instead to 
be extended in all three dimensions (e.g., DC I.1, 268a6-8). 
For Aristotle, tangibility is a mark of bodies not as such 
but only insofar as they are perceptible (GC II.2, 329b6-7).
12  How, precisely, the refined giants’ position 
accommodates the earlier problem cases is not specified 
in the text. Crivelli suggests, plausibly to my mind, that 
a soul or a virtue might count as a being for the refined 
giants since each ‘causes people to act in ways in which 
they would not in its absence’ and thus ‘may be described 
as having the power of affecting things in [… having] the 
quasi-causal power of making them be in certain ways’ 
(2012, 87). But what matters is simply that the refined 
giants’ position does, somehow or other, allow them to 
admit souls and the virtues as beings.
13  While my argument will not depend upon the 
point, I agree with Burnyeat 1982, esp. pp. 5–6, with n. 2 
that the basic argumentative structure of this section of 
the Theaetetus is a reductio: knowledge is not perception 
since various implications of that view are absurd. Chap-
pell 2005, 51 shows that this conception of the argument’s 
structure is compatible with both unitarian and revision-
ist readings of the text (i.e., with both the A reading and 
the B reading [on which, see Burnyeat 1990, 7–10]), and 
I intend to remain neutral with respect to those options 
here.
14  Socrates attributes the ‘secret doctrine’ to 
Protagoras, but the very fact that it is presented as a 
‘secret’ raises a question about the grounds for pinning it 
to his historical namesake (on which, see Brancacci 2011). 
And indeed, as soon as Socrates raises the doctrine, he 
rebrands it as a kind of ancient wisdom, something with 
respect to which ‘all the wise men of the past […] stand 
together’ (152e2-3). In the lines that follow, Heraclitus, 
Empedocles, Epicharmus, and Homer are all placed in 
Protagoras’ company. Parmenides is notable for being 
explicitly excepted. Melissus is later said to be in league 
with him (180e2 and 183e3).
15  Nor, conversely, does someone count among 
the initiates simply for being familiar with the theory. 
Socrates presents neither himself nor the fluxists’ primary 
opponents as having been initiated.
16  I have substituted Levett and Burnyeat’s 
translation (in Cooper 1997) of ‘kompsoteroi’ with an 
alternative from LSJ.
17  There are at least two senses of ‘refined’ op-
erative in each passage. First, the refined fluxists and the 
refined giants are both comparatively ‘gentle’ in character. 
This sense of ‘refinement’ is particularly evident, I submit, 
in their relative willingness to engage in discussion (I com-
ment further on this feature of Plato’s presentation below). 
Second, the refined fluxists and the refined giants are both 
comparatively ‘clever.’ The crude fluxists are uneducated, 
as ‘amousos’ implies, as are, by their own admission, the 
crude giants since education, culture, intelligence, and the 
like are neither tangible nor visible. 
 In both passages, assessments of comparative 
refinement can be made not only synchronically (e.g., 
Theait. 156a2 and Soph. 246d7-8) but also diachronically. 
This is because the interlocutors recognize a process of 
refinement in each passage—namely, initiation in the 
Theaetetus and betterment in the Sophist (246d4-5). 
 The treatment of that process is perhaps signif-
icant. In the Theaetetus, nothing explicit is said about the 
way in which the crude and refined fluxists’ respective po-
sitions are related. Yet, the initiation metaphor is sugges-
tive. As Plato presents it elsewhere, an initiation culmi-
nates in the initiate changing her mind (Meno 76e6-9), in 
the face of dialectical puzzles (Euthydemus 277d-e), but 
by refining her positions rather than simply jettisoning 
them (Phaedo 69b-c). Notably, in Socrates’ own initiation, 
that movement leads away from the particular bodies, 
and even body generally, that the uninitiated are present-
ed as focusing upon (Symposium 210a-b). Admittedly, 
though, this reconstruction is too speculative to count as 
compelling, let alone decisive, evidence of a parallel.
18  I have substituted Levett and Burnyeat’s 
translation (in Cooper 1997) of ‘sklêros’ and ‘antitupous’ 
with alternatives from LSJ. 
19  Compare Timaeus 31b5-6: ‘nothing could ever 
become […] tangible without something solid, nor solid 
without earth.’ 
 Campbell 1861, 50 n. 9 ties ‘sklêros’ and ‘anti-
tupous’ to Plato’s description of the crude giants along a 
different line. The ‘hard and repellent’ crude fluxists, he 
submits, recall the Sophist’s terrible or fearsome giants 
(246b4: deinous). 
20  I have substituted White’s translation (in Coo-
per 1997) of ‘spartoi’ and ‘autochtones’ with alternatives 
from LSJ.
21  Campbell 1861, 124 finds an echo of this 
phrase, ‘less than nothing [pros to mêde smikron],’ in 
Soph. 248c5’s ‘by even the smallest thing [pros to smikro-
taton].’ On the other hand, he denies that the difficulty 
in talking with the crude fluxists is the same as that in 
talking with the crude giants (1867, 120); I take Soph. 
246d6, quoted above, to meet the worry he raises.
22  An anonymous referee rightly notes that 
Theaetetus 179e-180c, on which I have drawn both in this 
paragraph and the one prior, does not unambiguously 
refer to the crude fluxists. An important indicator that 
this is, indeed, the way to take the reference comes in 
Theodorus’ description of those in question as those ‘who 
profess to be adepts [prospoiountai empeiroi]’ (179e4-5). 
Since ‘prospoieô’ connotes pretending (LSJ points to Gor-
gias 519c3 for this coloring of the verb), the description 
can be paraphrased as ‘those who profess to be but are not 
in fact initiates.’
23  The crude fluxists go on to deny ‘that actions 
and processes and the invisible world in general have any 
place in reality’ (155e5-6). The last component of that de-
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nial reveals a conception of body as tangible and visible, 
in that order. See note 11, above. The first two compo-
nents further liken them to the crude giants, who also do 
not admit capacities, unlike their refined compatriots. 
On this point, I disagree with Benardete, who takes the 
crude giants to ‘deny […] the changeable’ (1984, I.108). 
They deny changes (or, at least, deny that changes are 
fundamental), not the bodies capable of change.
24  Campbell 1861, 50 n. 6; 1867, 123 n. 1 is 
particularly sensitive to resemblances among Plato’s 
formulations of the crude fluxists’ and giant’s positions.
25  Sedley 2004, 46 n. 9 notes the parallel;  
Diès 1992, 109 n. 3 links the passages I use to support 
it. Whether this is merely a matter of presentation is a 
separate question that I will not here address.
 It is notable for Plato to develop a position 
on behalf of no one in particular. Indeed, Brown 1998, 
182 observes that, in the early and middle dialogues, 
Plato is unlikely to develop a position even on behalf of a 
determinate proponent who is neither participating in the 
conversation nor present for it.
26  Protagoras and others are no doubt regularly 
associated with the doctrine, but at critical junctures it 
is explicitly wrested from them and developed inde-
pendently. Presumably in relation, the refined fluxists’ 
central tenet is called a ‘veiled truth’ (155d10) hidden 
within what was already said to be a ‘secret doctrine’ 
(152c10).
27  Ross 1953, 102–103, Benardete 1984, II.41 
n. 65, Sedley 2004, 46 n. 9, Centrone 2008, n. 107, and 
Karfík 2011, 124 are among those who liken the refined 
fluxists’ and refined giants’ respective doctrines. While 
the parallels that I will present are perhaps insufficient to 
completely bridge the gap between capacity and motion, 
and so to simply identify the two doctrines (on this point, 
see Gonzalez 2011, 69–70), they reveal deep and pervasive 
agreements between those doctrines that are, I submit, 
sufficient to motivate the pair of methodological theses 
that I ultimately have in view.
28  On the significance of a commitment to a 
single criterion, see note 8, above.
29  Gonzalez notes the parallel, observing that, in 
both passages, ‘all things are identified with a dunamis of 
either ποιεῖν or παθεῖν’ (2011, 70). 
30  While, so far as I can see, there is no cause 
to doubt that, for the refined fluxists, all actions and 
passions are motions, the status of the converse claim—
that all motions are actions and passions—is less certain. 
Though I suspect the refined fluxists would accept it as 
well, I am not relying on the latter claim for the parallel 
in the body of the paper. 
31  Similarly, in a related context, the Visitor 
glosses ‘action and passion’ as ‘motion’ and ‘that which 
acts or is acted upon’ as ‘that which moves’ (Soph. 249b2). 
The inference in the body of the paper, it bears noting, 
is not presented directly on behalf of the refined giants. 
Rather, Theaetetus and the Visitor treat it as an implica-
tion of their doctrine when demarcating them from the 
friends of forms, who accept a qualified form of the doc-
trine. I discuss the evidential import of the passage below.
32  Leigh 2010, 76 emphasizes this point in her 
discussion of the Sophist. It is not trivial that capacities 
should be conceived of exclusively as capacities for mo-
tion. Focusing on the Sophist as well, Beere 2009, 12–13 
proposes that the difficulties arising in relation to this 
position prompt Aristotle to introduce both activities that 
are not also motions and, with them, capacities that are 
not also capacities for motion.
 This link between capacity and motion may 
also help to explain why, in the Sophist, the giants’ 
opponents, the friends of forms, might present their own 
position as denying that being has any share of motion, 
rather than as denying a claim about capacities directly. 
Just as the fluxists’ opponents proclaim that being is 
‘unmoving’ and ‘stands still’ (Theait. 180b2, 180e1-3, and 
183d1), the friends of forms maintain that ‘being always 
stays the same and in the same state’ (Soph. 248a12).
33  The systematic coupling of capacities for 
action and passion, though not uncommon in the 
corpus (see, e.g., Rep. VI, 507e6 ff. and Leg. X, 903b4-9), 
is similarly nontrivial. To draw a comparison with the 
Charmides, it would preclude a capacity, like knowledge, 
from acting upon itself (cf. Barnes 2001, 79).
34  Seeck 2011, 78 n. 70 draws a related parallel to 
Theait. 184b7-185a7.
35  I owe the impetus for this paper to Charles 
Kahn and Susan Meyer, who encouraged me to develop 
and support its central thesis, a version of which I 
had rather flatly asserted in a footnote to my doctoral 
dissertation. I am also grateful to Francisco Gonzalez, 
two anonymous referees, and audiences at Portland State 
University and an SAGP meeting at Fordham University 
for comments on drafts.
